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Local Authority:
Communities Have Means of Influencing Land Use
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
June 18, 2003

John R. Nolon
[The author is Professor of law and Director of the Land Use Law Center of Pace
University School of Law and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies.]
Abstract: This case analysis examines several court decisions, including the
results of three New York Court of Appeals cases where litigants challenged the
constitutionality of municipal land use decisions. In each case, the court afforded
the municipality deference and found that their objectives were rationally related
to the decisions, mostly decisions to deny development.
However, this
presumption of validity given to local legislatures and quasi-judicial agencies
presents a problem when land use decisions affect outside municipalities.
Thankfully, through the use of training programs, municipalities are learning to
work together to resolve intermunicipal land use issues.
***
Examined from the perspective of local land use officials, state law has them in a
bind. Faced with urban decay in one community, rampant sprawl in another, and
a depressed economy in a third, they feel ill equipped, legally, to redirect the
market forces to accomplish their community development objectives. At the
Land Use Law Center at Pace Law School, we have now trained over 600 local
land use leaders from all types of communities in the Hudson River Valley and
have heard this complaint from all too many all of them.
To be specific, they say, local governments have too few strategic tools to use,
must allow all privately owned land to be developed, and have no ability to
protect themselves from the external impacts of land use projects approved in
adjacent communities. Further, they fear that if take bold steps to direct
development to occur in certain places and prevent it in others, they will lose
when landowners take them to court. This column deals primarily with this latter
fear, then turns to the other assumptions that limit local officials’ thinking about
their ability to achieve their community’s land use objectives. It concludes that
most of these fears are false and that new paradigms are available to shape a
more positive local response to land use challenges.
Last year, a trilogy of Court of Appeals decisions, all decided on July first, should
put to rest any concerns about the attitude of the courts toward fact-based local

land use decisions. The first case, Matter of Retail Property Trust v Board of
Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 98 N.Y.2d 190 (2002), involves the
denial of a special use permit sought by a regional mall for its expansion to
accommodate a new department store. The ZBA denied the permit concluding
that the proposed expansion would adversely impact traffic and air quality. The
ZBA based its determination on facts presented to it by the project’s opponents
regarding the air pollution and traffic to be caused by other projects approved,
but not yet built, in the vicinity of the mall. In overruling the Appellate Division
reversal of the zoning board’s determination, the Court of Appeals held that the
ZBA's decision was based on substantial evidence and was rational. Although
the mall owner presented credible evidence to support its proposed expansion of
the mall, the Court of Appeals reasoned that deference must be given to the ZBA
when the record contains other substantial grounds on which to base a denial.
Several aspects of this case counter local fears that courts are hostile to their
efforts to control development. First, the source of the reports relied on – the
project’s opponents – was not important to the court’s determination. As long as
the reports are factual and contain substantial evidence supporting the board’s
decision, they are sufficient to justify that decision. Second, the court’s role is not
to weigh or balance the evidence presented in support of both sides, but simply
to determine whether there was substantial evidence on the record that supports
the board’s decision. In other words the court may not substitute its judgment of
the facts and their weight for that of the local administrative review board. Third,
the Court of Appeals noted specifically that local review boards in these
circumstances are entitled to judicial deference.
In Ifrah v. Utschig, 98 N.Y. 2d 304 (2002), a landowner challenged the denial of a
request for four area variances by the Town of Harrison’s zoning board of
appeals. The variances requested would have allowed the landowner to
subdivide an already nonconforming lot and allow him to build a second home on
the land. The result would have been to create two lots - each including less
than a half acre in an area zoned for single-family housing on lots of at least one
acre in size. Again, the neighbors complained and put facts on the record about
the impact on the neighborhood of the extra home and the traffic it would
generate. The Appellate Division was impressed by the fact that most of the
homes in the neighborhood were built on substandard size lots and that more
than half of them were on lots even smaller than those proposed by the
landowner in his variance request. From this, the Appellate Division concluded
that granting the variance would not have an adverse effect on the neighborhood
and thus the town zoning board’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the denial of the variances by the
zoning board. Essentially, it held that the Appellate Division erroneously
performed the role of the local land use board by deciding which facts on the
record should be used to decide the matter. Under state law, area variance

decisions are to be made by local zoning boards after balancing a number of
considerations. The Court of Appeals noted that the neighbors, in addition to
simply voicing their opposition to the variances, placed facts on the record about
the adverse effect of the proposed modern home the neighborhood. They
documented the impact of contemporary design on the neo-Tudor architectural
style of the houses on the street, the interruption of the uniform spacing between
the existing homes that gave them the appearance of being on larger lots, and
the confluence of several existing driveways on the portion of the street affected
by the driveway of the proposed new home. These are facts. Although they
were placed on the record by the opponents, they do not reflect the unvarnished
opposition of the neighbors but rather the facts behind that opposition. Based on
these facts, the Court of Appeals found that the zoning board “could rationally
conclude that the detriment of the proposed subdivision posed to the
neighborhood outweighed the benefit sought by the landowner, and its
determination denying the requested variances was not arbitrary or capricious.”
In the third case, P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Village of
Pleasantville, 98 N.Y. 2d 683 (2002), the Court of Appeals again overruled an
Appellate Division decision that reversed a zoning board determination. In this
case, neighbors in a residentially zoned part of the village complained that the
new owner of a lot which contained a nonconforming industrial building had
changed its use in violation of the local zoning law. The village zoning board
determined that converting the use of a warehouse from storing customers’
goods to housing the new business’s equipment, inventory, and supplies was a
qualitative change in the nonconforming use of the type prohibited by local
zoning. Although both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division reversed
the board, the Court of Appeals found that the board could rationally have arrived
at its decision and that its decision should not be disturbed by the judiciary.
In these three cases, the Court of Appeals affirmed decisions made by local land
use boards acting in three different capacities: a review board determining
whether to approve a request for a special use permit (Retail Property Trust); an
appellate body balancing various factors to determine whether to award an area
variance (Ifrah); and an appellate body interpreting the zoning code and whether
it is violated by a change in land use (P.M.S. Assets). In all three capacities, the
local board was sustained, the intermediate courts told not to substitute their
judgments for that of the local board, and the existence of facts on the record
was found sufficient to uphold local board decisions under the substantial
evidence rule.
If the highest court affords these quasi-judicial and administrative review boards
such deference, imagine what it does when the local land use decision
challenged is made by the local legislature: the town board, village board of
trustees, or city council. In Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y. 2d
121, the petitioners challenged a New York City zoning amendment that provided
greater zoning incentives for education facilities than it did for low income

housing. The Court of Appeals held that the challengers had not carried their
burden of proving that the bonus provision was clearly arbitrary or capricious or
undertaken for an improper purpose. See also Kraveth v. Plenge, 446 N.Y.S.2d
807 (4th Dept. 1982), one of a long line of cases holding that when local
legislatures enact zoning amendments there is a “strong presumption of validity”
and that the challenger must demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the
amendment “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Tilles Investment Company v.
Huntington, 528 NYS2d 386 (2nd Dept 1988), the court held that “the Town was
not required to explore or utilize alternative measures which would place less
restrictions on the possible uses to which plaintiff’s property might be put.” To act
otherwise would put the court in the position of second guessing the discretionary
judgments of the local legislature. This is anathema to judges and illustrates why
they cloak local regulations with a presumption of validity.
The Retail Property Trust case, supra, assuages the local fear that adjacent
communities can not influence their neighbor’s land use decisions that might
adversely affect them. In this case, the Village of Garden City introduced its own
expert report into the record of the zoning board of the Town of Hempstead
showing that the additional traffic caused by the proposed expansion of the mall
would cause drivers to shift to less congested secondary roads running through
the village. The existence of this report on the record influenced the Court of
Appeals decision that the local zoning board’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. Since 1992, local governments have been encouraged by
state statute to cooperate in comprehensive planning, land use regulation, and
zoning enforcement. These state statutes make it clear that local governments
have the authority to create intermunicipal planning boards, zoning boards of
appeals, comprehensive plans, land use regulations, intermunicipal overlay
districts, and programs for shared land use administration and enforcement. N.Y.
GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996), N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §7-741 (McKinney 1996).
Increasingly local governments have taken advantage of this authority to
coordinate their regulatory influence on shared environmental resources,
transportation corridors, and economic development. In the Hudson River
Valley, the leaders we have trained are participating in nine such inter-local land
use councils and have formed a consortium of those councils at the regional
level. By their actions, these local leaders are putting to rest the fears of others
concerned that localities have no effective means of influencing the land use
actions of their neighbors.
Local land use officials in our training programs are surprised to learn that the
Court of Appeals empowered them over 50 years ago to invent their own land
use tools and techniques which will be upheld as long as their objective is to
achieve the most appropriate use of the land. In reliance on this implied
authority, communities have invented incentive zoning, planned unit development
districts, traditional neighborhood development districts, recreational zoning, and
floating zones, which was the technique attacked as beyond local zoning

authority in Rodgers. v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115 (1951). The Court of Appeals,
in defending the village’s authority, noted “In view, however, of Tarrytown’s
changing scene and the other substantial reasons for the board’s decision, we
cannot say that its action was arbitrary or illegal. While hardships may be
imposed on this or that owner, cardinal is the principle that what is best for the
body politic in the long run must prevail over the interests of particular
individuals.” Earlier in the decision it wrote “persons who own property in a
particular zone or use district enjoy no eternally vested right to that classification
if the public interest demands otherwise.”

